How GVTs Have Distorted Victorian Legislative Council Elections

Summary: Change is coming to the Victorian Legislative Council’s electoral system for November’s state election. Victoria becomes the last jurisdiction to abolish group voting tickets, a system that allowed parties to control preference flows and distort election results. Voters will now control between-party preferences and the method of voting mimics the Senate system in use since 2016. The change favours parties that campaign for votes over parties that rely on preferences. Based on past results, the big losers will be minor parties whose election from low votes has been achieved by “preference harvesting” tactics, something that is impossible with group voting tickets abolished.

The Victorian Labor government’s bill to abolish group voting tickets (GVTs) for Legislative Council elections was introduced on Tuesday 28 July, passed the lower house the next day with no opposition, and will be debated in the the upper house on Tuesday 11 August.

The bill is supported by the government, opposition and Greens and will pass by week’s end. The new voting rules will be in place for November’s state election.

(Update 9:30pm 11 August: the bill passed the upper house without amendment. The next step is royal assent by the Governor at which point the amendments in the bill are incorporated into the Electoral Act.)

Inside this post I look back at the five Victorian elections that have used GVTs and estimate how the results might have looked without GVTs. In summary –

• The new system will favour parties that attract significant first preference support and disadvantage parties that rely heavily on preferences. Based on my analysis of post-GVT Senate results, (see this post), weaker preference flows will make it very difficult for a party to be elected with less than 6% in a region.
• Across the 2014, 2018 and 2022 elections, 24 leading candidates who began the preference distribution with more than 6% of the vote were defeated by lower polling candidates. Three of the defeated candidates polled above 12% or 0.7 quotas.
• At the same elections there were 20 candidates elected from under 6%, including nine that polled below 3%.
• Without GVTs, the 2014 election would have seen five fewer minor party MLCs elected, the seats instead going one Labor, two Coalition and two Greens.
• Without GVTs, the 2018 election would have seen seven fewer minor party MLCs elected, the seats instead going one Labor, three Coalition and three Greens.
• Without GVTs, the 2022 result would have seen six fewer minor party MLCs elected, the seats instead going one Labor, one Coalition and four Greens.
• Over the last three elections, the number of non-Green minor party members would have fallen from 22 to 4. The number of Greens elected would have risen from 10 to 19, Labor from 47 to 50, and the Coalition from 41 to 47.

Table 1 below shows a four party breakdown of seats won at elections since 2006, along with my estimated results had there been no GVTs. My estimates assume the same parties contested election and the same party vote shares were recorded. I explain my method for estimating results inside the post.

Table 1 – Legislative Council Seats 2006-2022 – With and Without GVTs

Election	Alternatives	ALP	L/NP	GRN	OTH
2006	Actual result	19	17	3	1
	Estimate without GVTs	20	17	3	..
2010	Actual result	16	21	3	..
	Estimate without GVTs	16	21	3	..
2014	Actual result	14	16	5	5
	Estimate without GVTs	15	18	7	..
2018	Actual result	18	11	1	10
	Estimate without GVTs	19	14	4	3
2022	Actual result	15	14	4	7
	Estimate without GVTs	16	15	8	1

Source: Estimated results without GVTs calculated by Antony Green as set out in the post.

The changed results are due to weaker preference flows with the abolition of GVTs. Preference ‘deals’ implemented by GVTs were previously used to engineer results. Even the smallest parties could deliver preference flows above 90%. GVT deals could deliver victory to parties with little electoral support at the expense parties with up to 14 times the vote. These remarkable come from behind victories were created by GVT preference deals, not by the actions of voters.

Three of the more remarkable results occurred in 2018. In Eastern Metropolitan Region, the Transport Matters Party was elected from 0.62%, defeating a Greens candidate who began the count with 9.0%. In Southern-Eastern Metropolitan Region, the Liberal Democrats polled just 0.84% but defeated the second Liberal candidate who began the count with 12.3%. In Southern Metropolitan Region, the Sustainable Australia Party polled 1.32% but defeated the Greens on 13.5%. (Data in this paragraph has been corrected.)

Results such as these could only happen under an electoral system where voters are herded into voting for above-the-line for tickets with preferences controlled by parties.

A decade of experience with Senate elections since GVTs were abolished, and evidence from Legislative Council elections in other states, shows that preference flows are much weaker without GVTs. Larger parties that campaign actively can still influence preference decisions and create stronger preference flows, but the flows of smaller parties become almost random. This decreases the ability of parties to win from trailing positions.

When voters control preferences rather than parties, the system rewards parties that attract first preference votes over parties that rely on opaque and labyrinthine preference deals. The days of preference ‘whisperers’, preference ‘harvesting’ and ‘corralling’ preferences disappear when GVTs are abolished. Voters first preference party choices play a greater role in determining which parties elect members.

But I need to stress that the analysis in this post is about the parties that have contested the last five Victorian Legislative Council elections, not the parties contested the 2026 election.

It is clear from polls that Pauline Hanson’s One Nation will poll strongly, will elect MLCs, and probably outpoll the Greens. I make no comment on whether abolishing GVTs increases or decreases the number of MLCs that One Nation might elect.

What is certain is that abolishing GVTs will see the number of MLCs elected by party more accurately reflect vote share by party. The new system will better translate the will of the electorate into representation than any election conducted with GVTs.

The New Legislative Council Voting System

The new voting system will be familiar to Victorians as it mirrors the reformed Senate system used at the last four Federal elections.

Group Voting Tickets are abolished. Instead of only being allowed to mark one voting square ‘above-the-line’ (ATL) on the ballot paper, voters can show an ordering of ATL preferences for parties. In future, the only between-party preferences in the count will be those completed by voters. Parties can try to influence voters with how-to-vote preference recommendations, but choices on between-party preferences will now be left to voters.

The new voting instructions will be –

• For an ATL vote, complete at least five ATL preferences for parties. Voters are free to mark preferences beyond five and ballot papers will continue to count as long as further preferences are shown for a continuing candidate.
• To avoid a rise in informal voting, the Senate’s ATL saving provision has been adopted. Any vote with fewer than five ATL preferences but at least a valid ATL first preference will remain formal.
• There is no change to below-the-line (BTL) voting with five preferences required for a formal vote. There is no savings provision for BTL votes with fewer than five preferences..
• The Legislative Council’s structure of five members elected from each of eight regions remains. A future parliament may choose to adopt state-wide election as used for the Senate and for Legislative Councils in other mainland states. Any proposal to alter the Council’s region structure must receive approval at a referendum.

The Senate’s instructions are that at least six ATL preferences should be completed. As Victoria elects five members per regions, and already has ballot paper instructions to mark five preferences for a BTL vote, five has been adopted as the minimum number of preferences for an ATL vote. There should be no confusion between the Senate and Victorian rules.

Where the Senate has staggered terms with state Senators divided into two rotation, all 40 members of the Victorian Legislative Council are elected at every election for a single maximum four-year term. There is no change to the structure of when members are elected or their terms.

Electing Five versus Six Members

There is an important difference between electing 6-Senators per state and electing 5-MLCs per region.

Six vacancy half-Senate elections tend to produce left-right 3-3 deadlocks. The quota for election is 14.3%, 28.6% for two quotas, 42.9% for 3, and 57.1% for one party to win four of six Senators in a state. The pattern that has developed is that three ‘left’ seats tend to split two Labor one Green, and the three ‘right’ seats as two or three for the Coalition with another right party winning some seats. One Nation won the third ‘right’ seat in three of the six states at the 2025 Federal election.

Five member Legislative Council regions deliver one seat at 16.7%, two at 33.3%, and 3 of 5 seats with 50% of the vote after preferences. In most regions where two Labor and two Coalition MLCs have been elected, what I call the region’s ‘hinge’ fifth seat helps determine the Legislative Council’s balance of power.

The hinge seats can be won by the higher polling major party, or by a third party.

If you look at the the last three Victorian Legislative Council elections, it is clear that GVTs have been used to try blocking the Greens from winning ‘hinge’ seats and the Legislative Council’s balance of power. Labor, the Coalition and numerous minor parties have engaged in GVT preference swaps to block the Greens.

As the numbers in Table 1 show, Labor governments in office since 2014 have dealt with Legislative Councils where the balance of power has been divided between the Greens and other minor parties. This divided balance of power has been created by GVTs. By my estimates, without GVTs, the Greens would have held the upper house balance of power alone since 2014.

Labor was not wholly responsible for the Greens being denied the balance of power, but Labor willingly joined with the Coalition and minor parties in deals designed to thwart the Greens. But that was when preference deals could by delivered by GVTs.

Without GVTs, Labor surpluses beyond one or two quotas will compete directly with Greens candidates and minor parties to win ‘hinge’ seats. The end of GVTs means who wins the ‘hinge’ seats can no longer be engineered and the winners will be determined by the first preference choices of voters, and also how they choose to direct preferences.

In 2026 One Nation will join Labor, the Coalition and Greens as parties polling strongly enough to compete for seats. Senate results have shown that the major parties, Greens and One Nation are the parties most likely to influence their supporters with how-to-vote recommendations. The abolition of GVTs diminishes the importance of minor party preferences, but what the largest parties do with how-to-vote recommendations will still matter. Which of the larger parties is excluded during the distribution of preferences, and whether voters follow how-to-vote recommendations, will determine the Legislative Council’s balance of power in the next parliament.

The Defeated Leader Ratio (DLR)

Preferences play no role in single member contests where a candidate achieves 50% of the vote. In multi-member contests like Legislative Council regions, preferences also play no role if a candidate achieves a quota of votes on first preferences.

But if the leading candidate or candidates in a race fall short of a quota on first preferences, then three conditions determine whether leading candidates can avoid being passed and defeated by trailing candidates. These are –

• Closeness to quota – how far short of quota is the leading candidate? The closer to quota the harder it is for a trailing candidate to catch the leader.
• The gap between leading and trailing candidate – the bigger the gap the harder it is for a trailing candidate to catch the leading candidate.
• The preference flow required – can the trailing candidate attract enough preferences to close the gap before the leading candidate reaches quota.

The closer the leading candidate is to quota, and the larger the gap between the candidates, then the higher the flow of preferences required for a trailing candidate to win. Exhaustion of preferences also works in favour of a leading candidate.

In theory, if preference flows can reach 100%, then a leading candidate can always be caught however close they are to quota and no matter how big their lead. That GVTs allowed preference flows to approach 100% is why they could produce so many improbable come from behind wins.

In recent years I’ve been working on something I call the Defeated Leader Ratio (DLR) as a single measure of the above three conditions and how likely it is that a trailing candidate can win. The calculation is –

Defeated Leader Ratio (DLR) = (Leading Candidate Votes) divided by (Trailing Candidate votes)

Based on analysing upper house results over the past few decades, I’ve seen this ratio reach 23 in the case of Ricky Muir’s election to the Senate through GVTs at the 2013 Victorian Senate election, and an astounding 51 in the case of the Dayling Saving Party’s victory through GVTs at the 2021 Western Australian election.

But without GVTs, this ratio for a defeated leader/trailing winner doesn’t often get above 1.5. That’s a value corresponding to a candidate on 4% defeating a candidate on 6%, or 8% defeating 12%.

Table 2 below shows all 28 cases at Victorian Legislative Council elections since 2006 where a trailing candidate won. The table shows the % vote for the defeated leading candidate and the trailing winning candidate.

The column labelled ‘DLR’ is the Defeated Leader Ratio for each trailing win. Of the 28 cases, 20 produce a DLR greater than 1.5. I have highlighted these in bold and shaded the contest. In my experience, DLR values above 1.5 are associated with victories that can only be achieved at elections using GVTs.

There are eight contests where the DLR value is under 1.5, shown with no highlighting. In these contests the trailing candidate won with the help of GVTs, but with a DLR under 1.5, it would be possible for the trailing candidate to close the gap and win based on preferences recommendations and voters completing their own preferences.

As a comparison, the 2025 Senate election was the first since the abolition of GVTs where a trailing candidate won a state Senate seat. One Nation achieved two come from behind victories against Labor. In Western Australia the Labor DLR value was 1.29, in New South Wales the ratio was 1.49, both under my 1.5 cut-off. It shows that trailing candidates can win without GVTs.

I don’t claim a DLR under 1.5 is deterministic. It is a rule of thumb, a rough rule, that in non-GVT elections separates possible results from unlikely results.

My predictions of past Legislative Council results displayed in Table 1 is based re-assigning the winning party in the 20 contests where the DLR was greater than 1.5. The eight under 1.5 I’ve estimated to remain with the winning party because victory could have been achieved without GVTs.

Table 2 – Contests with a Defeated Leader and Trailing Winner 2006-2022

			Defeated Leader		Trailing
Election	Region	DLR	% Vote	Party	% Vote	Party
2006	EVIC	1.07	Greens	9.16	National *	8.60
2006	WVIC	3.26	Labor	8.67	DLP	2.66
2010	WMET	1.13	Labor	13.53	Greens *	12.00
2010	WVIC	1.02	Greens	10.22	Lib/Nat *	10.00
2014	EMET	1.15	Labor	12.01	Greens	10.47
2014	EVIC	3.48	Greens	8.48	SFF	2.44
2014	NMET	2.46	Labor	7.06	Sex Party	2.87
2014	NVIC	2.24	Lib/Nat	7.84	SFF	3.50
2014	SEME	1.06	Labor	6.67	Greens *	6.29
2014	WMET	1.03	Labor	10.65	Greens *	10.33
2014	WMET	2.68	Liberal	6.90	DLP	2.57
2014	WVIC	7.12	Greens	9.19	Vote 1 Local Jobs	1.29
2018	EMET	14.52	Greens	9.00	Transport Matters	0.62
2018	EVIC	1.35	Greens	6.73	SFF *	5.00
2018	NMET	2.22	Labor	9.25	Reason Party	4.17
2018	NVIC	3.00	Lib/Nat	14.54	Hinch Justice Party	4.85
2018	NVIC	2.08	SFF	7.85	Liberal Democrats	3.78
2018	SEME	14.64	Liberal	12.30	Liberal Democrats	0.84
2018	SMET	10.20	Greens	13.46	Sustainable Australia	1.32
2018	WMET	1.28	Greens	8.71	Hinch Justice Party *	6.82
2018	WVIC	2.78	Lib/Nat	12.35	Hinch Justice Party	4.45
2018	WVIC	2.70	Greens	7.49	Animal Justice	2.77
2022	EVIC	2.66	Greens	7.99	SFF	3.00
2022	NVIC	3.27	Labor	12.18	One Nation	3.72
2022	NVIC	4.47	Greens	6.97	Animal Justice	1.56
2022	SEME	1.92	Liberal	10.10	Legalise Cannabis	5.25
2022	SEME	1.86	Greens	6.72	Liberal Democrats	3.61
2022	WMET	1.88	Greens	8.07	Legalise Cannabis	4.30

* indicates trailing wins where the Defeated Leader Ratio (DLR) was under 1.5 and could have been achieved without GVTs.

Region Codes: EMET Eastern Metropolitan, EVIC Eastern Victoria, NMET Northern Metropolitan, NVIC Northern Victoria, SEME South-Eastern Metropolitan, SMET Southern Metropolitan, WMET Western Metropolitan, WVIC Western Victoria.